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Commentary
Paul Rothstein
crisis assistance somewhat differently. I also suggest
that measured federal assistance in a crisis need
not create moral hazard if it is conditioned on
specific and positive state actions taken before the
crisis, such as transparent accounting and strong
stabilization funds. Crisis assistance that is con-
tingent on more than just the crisis could provide
substantial net benefits.
Bob begins with a brief and balanced review
of the key principles of efficient state-level public
finance. He explains the virtues of residence-based
taxes, but notes that source-based taxes are more
common. He argues that the mobility of taxpayers
and factors of production discipline state govern-
ments, but notes that benefit spillovers make inter-
governmental transfers necessary. He draws on
Bohn and Inman (1996) to give conditions under
which states will use long-term debt appropriately,
but notes that the conditions are strong and public
officials have many ways to hide deficits and use
borrowed money to fund current services. He then
summarizes:
In FY 2006, states were spending money on
appropriate state functions, raising most of
their money with efficient resident-based taxes,
and running small current-account fiscal sur-
pluses…The federal government provides assis-
tance for state services with arguably significant
interstate spill  overs and does so with appropri-
ate price-based subsidies. By most measures,
states were fulfilling their assigned role in our
federal system of public finance in FY 2006
(Inman, pp. 70-71).
I
n this paper, Bob Inman gives a strong cri-
tique of crisis-driven federal support for the
states. He bases this critique on an equally
strong defense of American state-level public
finance and the importance of preserving its capa-
bilities. He argues that funneling crisis-driven
federal money through state governments creates
moral hazard and risks undermining a fundamen-
tally sound system. If macroeconomic stimulus is
needed, changes in federal taxes and transfers can
deliver it. Bob then analyzes the assistance to states
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA) and argues that its relief is not well
targeted to states with high unemployment or large
budget gaps. He concludes that instead of offering
more (or future) support, the federal government
should reconfirm its commitment not to bail out
state governments.
I essentially agree with Bob’s conclusion about
crisis-driven federal support for the states, which
I call “ARRA-type spending.” I am not, however,
as inclined as Bob to read either the theory or the
data about state-level public finance in such a posi-
tive way. The conditions that guarantee economic
efficiency in models with multiple regions are
strong and generally do not hold. Free migration
of people and factors is a (mostly) good and power-
ful force but it doesn’t do everything. More impor-
tant, there are many actual pathologies at the state
level, including large transfer programs, the under-
funding of state pension plans, and inadequate
rainy day funds. Since I find more flaws in the
status quo, I weigh the costs and benefits of federal
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I would add that state-level public finance is
also impressive over normal business cycles.
Recent empirical work by Rodden and Wibbels
(2010) on seven federations establishes that during
downturns U.S. states draw down stabilization
funds, reduce expenditures modestly, and allow
revenues to fall (but work to attenuate the decrease
with tax rate increases). These are good results
insofar as sharp reductions in state spending and
large tax increases can do outsized harm to busi-
nesses and consumers, a fact that Bob notes.1 These
results are largely achieved without additional
central government assistance: In all but one fed-
eration, central government grants are procyclical
or neutral.2 Countercyclical ARRA-type transfers
are rare.
The story so far is very positive and points
toward efficient state-level public finance. There
are a few caveats, however.
First, free migration ensures that all people
reside in the location that best suits them, but what
ensures that their utility is as high as possible? This
is a complicated question. Migration imposes fiscal
discipline but it need not make the outcome fully
efficient. Sometimes decentralized efficiency fails
(Boadway and Flatters, 1982). The known condi-
tions under which efficiency holds are very specific
(Myers, 1990). For example, giving migrants owner-
ship stakes in the regions that they leave and enter
fully internalizes the costs and benefits of moving.
When capital is both mobile and taxed, inefficiency
is all but guaranteed if the tax simply reduces the
net return to capital and provides no benefits to
capital owners (Wildasin, 1989). Effici  ency has a
knife-edge quality when the tax funds local public
infrastructure that enhances capital productivity
(Dhillon, Wooders, and Zissimos, 2007).
These models tend to predict inefficiently low
levels of local public goods and infrastructure in
normal times. A race to the bottom is more likely
than a race to the top. Cutbacks in recessions should
therefore tend to produce large welfare losses, since
the cost exceeds the benefit on even the “first”
reduction. Federal assistance in a recession can
reduce this injury, and the net benefits may be large.
An important objection to the previous point
is that federal grants can ease fiscal competition
and the constraint it places on spending. This is
true, but mass migration and capital flows are not
the classic kinds of local public-good spillovers dis-
cussed at least as far back as Olson (1969). Federal
grants may plausibly correct Olsonian spill  overs,
but the complexity and subtlety of non-Olsonian
spillovers make it much harder to believe that
efficient grants can even be computed, much less
implemented. Indeed, just to illustrate the sub-
tleties, traditional Olsonian spillovers coupled
with mobility can make federal grants unneces-
sary (Wellisch, 1993).3 Fiscal competition and the
underprovision of local public goods seem closer
to reality than efficient federal grants.
My second caveat concerns Bob’s claim that
“states were spending money on appropriate state
functions.” This claim is problematic, and the
problem is Medicaid. Medicaid used 16.3 percent
of state general fund revenue in 2008, down from
17.4 percent in 2006, but still substantially above
the 14.4 percent in 1995.4 It averaged 20.7 percent
of total state expenditures in 2008, ranging from 8.4
percent in Alaska and 10.2 percent in Wyoming to
30.3 percent in Pennsylvania and 34.5 percent in
Missouri.5 In contrast, total public assistance expen-
ditures were just 1.7 percent of expenditures
across all states.6 Medicaid is an enormous pro-
gram and its commitments are widely regarded as
unsustainable (Ward and Dadayan, 2009; U.S.
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2009).
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1 This is not to deny the positive role that some exposure to negative
shocks can play in government resource allocation. Policy analysis
and improvement are not substitutes for the debates about priorities
and the program reviews that occur when there simply is no money. 
2 “These results should put to rest any perception that intergovern-
mental grants are broadly countercyclical” (Rodden and Wibbels,
2010, p. 50).
3 In Wellisch (1993) and Myers (1990), efficiency requires resources
to flow between regions, but these flows are decentralized in the
sense that they are generated in Nash equilibrium by (i) regional
taxes on property that is owned in part by nonresidents or (ii)
explicit transfer payments chosen by the regions themselves. Even
the Olsonian analysis is more complicated than it appears at first,
since local revenue is still needed and some of the burden may fall
on mobile bases.
4 National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO, 2009, Table
3).
5 NASBO (2009, Table 29).
6 NASBO (2009, Table 19).Medicaid is, fundamentally, a very large trans-
fer program. The general theory of federalism tells
us that there are substantial potential benefits from
complete centralization (Brown and Oates, 1987).
Empirical work on differences in costs and services
across the states provides additional support for
centralization (Holahan, Weil, and Wiener, 2003).
Furthermore, it is reasonable to suppose that
Medicaid draws resources away from other state
programs. An extra dollar of state-level Medicaid
revenue surely comes from some combination of
lower spending on other state programs and higher
taxes and not just from higher taxes alone. If so,
the marginal benefits from these other programs
are higher than they would be if not for Medicaid.
The harm from recession-induced cutbacks in other
programs is therefore also higher than it would be
if the states were not assigned this function.
A third caveat regarding efficient state-level
public finance concerns retiree obligations. The
proper matching of costs and benefits requires
current taxpayers to pay for the retirement benefits
of current state employees as part of their current
compensation. Opinions vary about how much
underfunding of retirement plans creates a risk of
default, but there is no question that any under-
funding shifts a fiscal burden to future taxpayers.7
Underfunding is, of course, widespread. Recent
work by Robert Novy-Marx at the University of
Chicago and Joshua Rauh of Northwestern com-
Rothstein
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2007 Total Balance Percentages and 2009 Budget Cuts by State
NOTE: The 2007 total balance as percent of expenditure. The total balance equals ending balance plus stabilization fund balance.
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Table 1
2007 Total Balances and 2009 Budget Cuts by State 
Fiscal year
2007 Total balance* 
State as percent of expenditure 2009  Across-the-board cuts 2009 Targeted cuts
Alaska 49.9 X




West Virginia  25.6
Louisiana 20.8 X
Texas 20.5
Delaware 17.4 X X
Kansas 16.6 X X





Georgia 13.1 X X
Missouri 13.0 X X
Wyoming 13.0
Nevada 12.8 X X
Tennessee 12.2
Maryland 12.1 X X
South Dakota  12.1
Florida 11.8 X
Iowa 11.4 X X
Colorado 11.2 X
Mississippi 11.1 X
New Hampshire  11.0 X
North Carolina  10.8 X X
Arizona 10.5 X X
Hawaii 10.3 X
Massachusetts 10.0 X X
Kentucky 9.2 X X
New Mexico  9.1 X X
Connecticut 8.9 X X
Virginia 8.5 X
New Jersey  7.3 X X
Indiana 7.2 X X
Washington 7.2 X
Utah 6.4
New York  5.9 X X
Ohio 4.9 X X
Vermont 4.7 X
Pennsylvania 4.7 X X
Maine 4.5 X
California 4.3 X
Illinois 3.6 X X
Rhode Island  3.3 X X
Wisconsin 0.9 X X
Michigan 0.1 X X
Arkansas 0.0 X
NOTE: *The total balance equals ending balance plus stabilization fund balance.
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that the structure of the plan reveals a more basic
goal: to pass a spending bill quickly. This is why
the ARRA made extensive use of existing programs
and aid distribution formulas. These formulas do
not track current economic conditions in the states,
but using them minimized disruptive haggling
among legislators.
The ARRA might have provided greater short-
term gains in welfare if it had been targeted to
places with the greatest need. Better targeting might
also have created larger multiplier effects and
macroeconomic stimulus. Unfortunately, once a
crisis develops, targeting assistance to the places
with the greatest need may cause the electorate to
prefer mismanagement, in which case it is surely
the worst policy in terms of moral hazard. Thus, it
is also hard to recommend that the ARRA should
have been better targeted. Is there a policy with
better short-term and long-term properties than
ARRA-type spending?
In principle, the answer is yes. The key to crisis
assistance that is beneficial on net is to make it
contingent on more than just the crisis. It is worth
recalling that conditions on federal grants in the
past have improved the functioning and profession-
alism of state agencies.9 It may be feasible to use
indicators of responsible state budgeting, such as
commitments to transparent budgeting and stabi-
lization funds, to define qualifying standards for
federal assistance during crises.
At the end of fiscal year 2007, 31 states had
reserves equal to at least 10 percent of state expen-
puted the existing liabilities to current state employ-
ees from 116 state pension plans. Assets in these
plans were $1.9 trillion at the end of 2008, but lia-
bilities exceeded assets by at least $1.3 trillion and
perhaps by as much $3.3 trillion.8
I raise this particular issue to discuss a general
point about moral hazard. If a pension fund becomes
insolvent, the political leaders who did not set
aside sufficient resources would surely be punished
even if the federal government stepped in to soften
the consequences. Thus, it is not clear how the
expectation of federal assistance influences their
decisions. The same conclusion holds if those
leaders do not expect to be in office when a crisis
occurs. Bob notes that state decisionmakers have
various ways of hiding debt. Perhaps this lack of
transparency is the real problem; if so, it is not clear
that moral hazard is relevant. Common sense about
moral hazard is sufficient to identify the worst
public policies, but models of the economic and
political incentives facing decisionmakers are
necessary for evaluating more careful proposals
about federal assistance.
Bob’s discussion of the $233 billion in state
assistance through the ARRA neatly summarizes a
complicated policy. The nominal goal of this state
assistance is to protect core state services and sup-
port states in particular distress. The aggregate fund-
ing is sufficient to close three years of projected
state budget gaps. However, by regressing state-
level assistance against various measures of state
need, Bob shows quite elegantly that assistance is
only weakly correlated with need. He then argues
Table 2
Number of States Making Budget Cuts in 2009 by Adequacy of Total Balances in 2007
Type of cuts in FY 2009
Across-the-board 
Total balance as percent of expenditure and targeted Across-the-board only Targeted only None
FY 2007: ≥10% (no. of states = 31) 11 4 6 10
FY 2007: <10% (no. of states = 19) 12 1 4 2
SOURCE: NGA and NASBO (2007, Table A-13; 2009, Table A-5a) and author’s calculations. FY, fiscal year.
8 Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009, p. 4).
9 This was certainly true for road building and public assistance; see
Derthick (2001, pp. 15-17).ditures. Nevertheless, in fiscal year 2009, 11 of
these states had to enact both across-the-board and
targeted spending cuts (see Figure 1 and Tables 1
and 2). An assistance plan that helped these 31
states—but did not support the 12 that entered the
recession in a weaker position and also enacted
both types of cuts—might enhance welfare with
little risk of moral hazard. This seems like an
approach worth studying.
The ARRA provides crisis-driven support for
state programs. Bob sharply criticizes this approach
to fiscal federalism, emphasizing moral hazard
problems and the poor targeting of the support. I
agree with his critique, but I still think there is a
role for well-designed federal support during crises.
Certain flaws in state finance suggest the possibil-
Rothstein
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ity of large welfare losses from cutbacks during
recessions. A policy that delivers federal support
during crises for qualifying states can reduce such
losses, encourage transparent budgeting and larger
stabilization funds, and need not present moral
hazard problems. This requires further research,
of course. In sum, Bob provides strong arguments
for uncoupling macroeconomic stimulus spending
from federal support for state programs during
crises but does not argue against crisis support
altogether. Indeed, crisis support for qualifying
states might even help to forestall future ARRA-
type spending, since qualifying states are not likely
to condone support for those that were less fiscally
responsible in better times.
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